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'TERRORIST SPEECH': DETAINED
PROPAGANDISTS AND THE ISSUE OF
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
MICHAEL J. LEBOWITZ*
INTRODUCTION
In November 2008, Ali al-Bahlul was sentenced by a United
States military commission to life in prison.' The Yemeni was convicted
of material support to terrorism, conspiracy, and solicitation.2 Al-Bahlul
was certainly a devoted and trained al Qaeda member, but his role in the
terrorist organization was anything but typical. Instead of dabbling
directly in bombs and kidnappings, al-Bahlul dealt with video production
equipment, cameras, and video-editing software.3 This is because al-
Bahlul was the head of As-Sahaab, al Qaeda's in-house media
foundation.4 Tasked directly by Osama bin Laden, al-Bahlul produced
propaganda and recruiting videos while essentially serving as bin
* J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law; B.A., Kent State
University. Lebowitz serves as a war crimes prosecutor in the Office of Military
Commissions, and previously served as chief legal assistance attorney and military
defense counsel in the Va. Army National Guard as part of the U.S. Army Judge
Advocate General's Corps. He deployed to Iraq in 2005-2006 as a paratrooper with
the Pathfinder Company of the 101st Airborne Division. He is also a litigation
attorney and military defense counsel in private practice. Lebowitz assisted the
government in the 2011 en banc appellate arguments in United States v. Al Bahlul at
the Court of Military Commissions Review.
1. See Trial Transcript at 992, United States v. Al Bahlul, C.M.C.R. No. 09-
001 (U.S. Mil. Comm'n 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/
news/05%20al%2OBahlul-trans-Pages%20717-993-Redacted.pdf.
2. Id. at 847.
3. EVAN F. KOHLMANN, NINE ELEVEN/FINDING ANSWERS FOUND., INSIDE AS-
SAHAAB: THE STORY OF ALl AL-BAHLUL AND THE EVOLUTION OF AL-QAIDA'S
PROPAGANDA 1-2 (2008), http://www.nefafoundation.org/
miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefabahlulsahaabl208.pdf.
4. Id. at 1.
574 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
Laden's "Public Relations Secretary."5 As such, al-Bahlul was more Sean
McManus (head of CBS News) than Khalid Shaykh Muhammad
(purported 9/11 mastermind) as he performed his duties in a manner
more akin to Michael Moore (controversial documentary filmmaker).
But despite the First Amendment protections offered to U.S. citizens, it
was these media activities that ultimately served to condemn al-Bahlul to
life in U.S. military custody as a convicted war criminal.6
In the summer of 2010, a military appeals court heard the appeal
of al-Bahlul's conviction as required in military commissions cases.
Based on al-Bahlul's boycott of the U.S. legal system - which
continued throughout nearly his entire trial - it appears unlikely that he
will authorize further appeals.7 But the prosecution and conviction of al-
Bahlul for his media activities is notable because it raises the question of
whether the government, through the U.S. military, can capture a non-
citizen during an overseas operation, detain him for many years, and
ultimately prosecute him for what, in a different situation, could amount
to First Amendment-protected speech. In fact, although al-Bahlul mostly
5. Id. at 5. Al-Bahlul's most prominent recruitment video was titled "The
Solution." This video provided bloody images of purported violence against
Muslims, portrayed the attack on the USS Cole as a heroic act on behalf of
worldwide Muslims, and urged continued attacks. Jane Sutton, Bin Laden's Publicist
Gets Life in Prison, REUTERS, Nov. 3, 2008, http://www.reuters.com
/article/2008/l l/03/us-guantanamo-hearings-idUSTRE49R50Z20081103.
6. See KOHLMANN, supra note 3, at 7; Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 992.
7. Jenny Percival, Guantanamo Jury Jails Bin Laden Media Chief for Life,
GUARDIAN, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world
/2008/nov/04/guantanamo-bin-laden-bahlul. Al-Bahlul had called his military
commission a "legal farce" and sat silently at his defense table until the last moment.
Al-Bahlul also instructed his detailed military defense counsel to refrain from
speaking or even answering questions from the judge. Id.
8. Michael Bowman, US Military Panel Hears Ist Guantanamo Appeal, VOICE
OF AMERICA, Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/usa/US-
Military-Panel-Hears-Ist--Guantanamo-Appeal-82696517.html. According to al-
Bahlul's appellate counsel:
Mr. Bahlul's conduct in making this documentary - his
prosecution for that conduct - was a violation of the U.S. First
Amendment. Not that Mr. al-Bahlul had particular First
Amendment rights, but that the constitutional restrictions on the
U.S. government prosecuting someone for speech made the
prosecution itself illegal. Mr. al-Bahlul's conduct in making
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stuck to his silent boycott at his trial, he did engage in a few political
rants as well as other provocative courtroom gestures such as making
paper airplanes to symbolize the 9/11 attacks. During one courtroom
statement, al-Bahlul declared the following: "I want you to know that
you are prosecuting a media man . . . . [Y]ou are prosecuting a media
member of al Qaeda and you are not prosecuting an al Qaeda member
who is about to do an operation." 9
This article seeks to analyze the notion of constitutional free
speech as it applies to "terrorist speech" that is conducted by overseas
enemy combatants who are ultimately detained and prosecuted by U.S.
forces. Part I analyzes the issue of enhanced constitutional rights relating
to foreign terror suspects detained by U.S. forces. Part II looks into the
notion of bypassing typical First Amendment arguments and instead
relying on a circumstance theory in prosecuting alien enemy combatants
engaged in propaganda activities. Part III offers a comparison between al
Qaeda propagandist al-Bahlul's war crimes case that was prosecuted
under U.S. domestic law with that of a similar propagandist convicted in
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
that documentary does not come close to the standard of inciting
violence that can be criminalized.
Id. Al-Bahlul's appellate counsel added the following statement:
There is little doubt that Mr. al-Bahlul is not a sympathetic
defendant. He embraces an ideology that glorifies violence,
justifies terrorism and opposes constitutional democracy. Charge
II, however, unconstitutionally conflates offensive behavior with
criminal behavior. As offensive as it may be, State of the Ummah
is speech that falls within the core protections of the First
Amendment, which forbids the prosecution of "the thoughts, the
beliefs, the ideals of the accused . . . ."
Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 10, United States v. Al Bahlul, C.M.C.R. No. 09-001
(U.S. Mil. Comm'n Sept. 1, 2009), available at http://www.defense.gov
/news/6%20%20%20United%2OStates%20v%20%20al%2OBahlul%20-
%20BrieP/o20for/o2OAppellant/o20%281%2OSeptember/202009%29.pdf.
9. Trial Transcript at 101-02, United States v. Al Bahlul, C.M.C.R. No. 09-001
(U.S. Mil. Comm'n 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news
/01%20al%2OBahlul-trans-Pages%201 to%20333-Redacted.pdf.
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I. PROPAGANDISTS & THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Enemy propagandists who use speech as opposed to more
traditional direct action are not a new phenomenon.'o Julius Streicher, for
example, established the primary Nazi propaganda newspaper, as well as
other notorious anti-Semitic publications.'I Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf,
perhaps better known as "Baghdad Bob," was the information minister
for Saddam Hussein's Iraqi government during the 2003 invasion. 12In
fact, virtually every wartime government has a spokesperson and every
military has units designated for psychological operations.13 Terror
organizations are no different. Al Qaeda notoriously employs media
10. World War 11 propagandist cases include: D'Aquino v. United States, 192
F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951) (addressing charges of treason against a woman who
worked as a radio broadcaster in Japan); Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.
1950) (discussing charges of treason against a man who worked as a radio
broadcaster in Germany and Austria); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C.
Cir. 1950) (addressing charges of treason against a woman and finding the radio
program she produced constituted "psychological warfare"); United States v.
Burgman, 87 F. Supp. 568 (D.D.C. 1949) (denying a new trial to a man convicted of
treason for working with the German government after having been a member of an
American Embassy in Berlin); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir.
1948) (affirming the treason conviction of a man for conduct as a radio broadcaster
of German propaganda).
11. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL: NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, at 294-95
(1947), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/NT-major-war-
criminals.html.
12. Center for Individual Freedom, The Collected Quotations of "Baghdad
Bob": The Iraqi Minister of Disinformation, http://www.cfif.org/htdocs
/freedomline/current/in our opinion/baghdad bob.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2011)
(explaining that al-Sahaf famously declared during a press conference that there
were no Americans in Baghdad, although journalists attending that same press event
reported witnessing U.S. tanks rumbling through city streets while al-Sahaf
continued speaking).
13. See generally U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations
Command (Airborne), Psychological Operations Fact Sheet, http://www.usacapoc.
army.mil/facts-psyop.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2011) ("Military Information
Support Operations is the dissemination of truthful information to foreign audiences
in support of U.S. policy and national objectives.").
savvy personnel in its hierarchy to help spread the organization's
propaganda and recruitment messages.14
Al-Bahlul, for example, was responsible for crafting a video
boasting al Qaeda's involvement in the deadly maritime attack against
the USS Cole.15 In addition, al-Bahlul produced and directed some of the
videotaped wills created on behalf of the soon-to-be 9/11 hijackers.' He
also performed various technical duties, including media equipment
maintenance.17 Moreover, al-Bahlul was tasked by bin Laden before the
9/11 attacks with establishing a mobile news feed so that the
organizational leadership could monitor news of the attacks as they
transpired.' 8 Another al Qaeda propagandist is Adam Pearlman, a U.S.
citizen from California.' 9 Pearlman, who changed his name to Adam
Yahiye Gadahn after converting to Islam in the 1990s, served as al
Qaeda's English-language spokesman for most of the post-9/11 decade.20
Gadahn issued numerous videotaped statements spreading the al Qaeda
message and touting other provocative missives directed toward
American citizens and others.2 Because of his propaganda work with al
22Qaeda, Gadahn was indicted in a California court on charges of treason.
A. Enhanced Constitutional Rights
Based on the fact that al Qaeda uses speech as a part of its
operations, the question then becomes whether designated enemy
combatants have some sort of enhanced First Amendment protections.
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . .
14. Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for
ISN 10024 at 17, http://www.defense.gov/news/transcriptisn10024.pdf (last visited
Mar. 17, 2011) (describing that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad announced under oath
that he was al Qaeda's Media Operations Director).
15. KOHLMANN, supra note 3, at 3.
16. Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at 319-20; KOHLMANN, supra note 3, at 6.
17. Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at 194.
18. Id. at 321; KOHLMANN, supra note 3, at 6.
19. First Superseding Indictment at 3-8, United States v. Gadahn, No. SA CR
05-254(A) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/adam-indictment.pdf.
20. Id.
2 1. Id.
22. Id.
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abridging the freedom of speech."2 3 The First Amendment, however,
leaves unspecified the scope of "the freedom of speech" that Congress
24
may not abridge. This unspecified nature is even more pronounced
when it relates to issues of wartime propaganda and enemy combatants
captured overseas. In the al-Bahlul case, for instance, defense attorneys
based much of their appellate argument on the contention that their client
was entitled to First Amendment protections due to his role as al Qaeda's
"media man." 2 5
The central argument in that case related to the fact that al-
Bahlul was detained under U.S. military jurisdiction at the Guantanamo
Bay Naval Station.26 This U.S. military detention of an al Qaeda
propagandist is slightly different than the more traditionally cited case,
United States ex. rel. Turner v. Williams, involving an anarchist who was
excluded from the country based on his political views.27 Williams dealt
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. For example, the Supreme Court has held that full speech protections do
not extend to child pornography, obscenity, true threats, defamation, or fighting
words. See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Watts v. United States, 394
U.S. 705 (1969) (true threats); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (defamation);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words). The Court in
Chaplinsky wrote:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words those which by their very utterance inflict or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Id. at 571-72.
25. Brief on Behalf of Appellant, supra note 8, at 10-12 (explaining that the
free speech issue also played a role, along with ex post facto arguments, during the
oral arguments in front of the U.S. Court of Military Commission's Review in
January 2010).
26. Id. at 14.
27. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904)
(explaining that an excludable alien is not entitled to First Amendment rights,
because "[h]e does not become one of the people to whom these things are secured
by our Constitution by an attempt to enter forbidden by law").
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with administrative measures within immigration law, whereas the case
with al-Bahlul relates to punishing propaganda activities via prosecution
28
as a war crime. In fact, al-Bahlul's appellate counsel argued that
because the U.S. Supreme Court extended certain other constitutional
rights to those detained at Guantanamo Bay, the other fundamental
constitutional rights also should apply.29 Of course, some of those other
fundamental rights are protected by the First Amendment. The prospect
of establishing such rights for detained enemy combatants is highlighted
by the fact that the Court has not directly undertaken a detailed analysis
of the extraterritorial application of the First Amendment when applied
to persons held in U.S. military detention.30
Perhaps the closest the Court has come to addressing this issue is
in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. That case was brought by
U.S.-based citizens and organizations wishing to end prohibitions that
made it a federal crime to support or provide resources to government-
designated terrorist groups, including the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK). 32 Ultimately, the Court ruled that speech-related activities can be
prosecuted when such advocacy is coordinated or otherwise is in direct
33
material support to an overseas terrorist organization. In addition, the
Court stated that the content of the speech is irrelevant, meaning that
whether such speech is philanthropic advocacy or religious or political
speech is not taken into account; the only thing that matters is whether
the activity engaged in by the U.S.-based citizen or organization
constitutes material support under terrorism laws.34
The utility of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project is that it
firmly offers a standard when dealing with the nexus between
propaganda and the material support of terrorism charge that has become
so prevalent in U.S. courts since 2001. However, the case still does not
28. Id. See also Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at 313-14.
29. See Brief on Behalf of Appellant, supra note 8, at 35-40.
30. See Government Responsive Brief at 7, United States v. Al Bahlul,
C.M.C.R. No. 09-001 (U.S. Mil. Comm'n Oct. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/2%20-
%20Prosecution%20Reply/o20Brief/20(30%200CT%2009)%20(58%20pages).pdf
31. 561 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
32. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2712-14.
33. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2713.
34. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2720-21.
2011] 579
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
directly relate to extraterritorial application of the First Amendment in
the context of a terrorist propagandist such as al-Bahlul, a detainee under
U.S. custody and control.
Another relevant free speech case from the First Circuit,
Chandler v. United States, was related to Nazi propagandist Douglas
Chandler, who went by the name "Paul Revere."35 In that case, a U.S.
citizen was charged with treason after preparing broadcasts and
producing recordings for the Nazi war effort.36 The Chandler court cited
an earlier case where the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that "one cannot,
by mere words, be guilty of treason." 37 However, in Chandler, the court
noted that:
[Chandler] trafficked with the enemy and as their
paid agent collaborated in the execution of a
program of psychological warfare designed by the
enemy to weaken the power of the United States to
wage war successfully . . . . It is preposterous to
talk about freedom of speech in this connection; the
case cannot be blown up into a great issue of civil
liberties. 38
The court also added that:
Trafficking with the enemy, in whatever form, is
wholly outside the shelter of the First Amendment.
Congress may make criminal any type of dealing
with the enemy which in its judgment may have the
potentiality of harm to our national interests,
including acting as a commentator on the enemy's
.39
short wave station.
The Chandler case offers guidance in terms of criminalizing
40
speech conducted on behalf of the enemy. But a significant difference
35. 171 F.2d 921, 925 (1st Cir. 1948).
36. Id. at 928.
37. Id. at 938 (quoting Wimmer v. United States, 264 F. 11, 12-13 (6th Cir.
1920)).
38. Id. at 939.
39. Id.
40. For more discussion on what may constitute treason, see Douglas A. Kash,
The United States v. Adam Gadahn: A Case for Treason, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. I
(2008):
580 [Vol. 9
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is that Chandler was a U.S. citizen charged with the high crime of
treason. Part of the court's rationale was that Chandler intended to betray
his country. That element certainly would not be satisfied in a case
against an alien combatant. Therefore, again, the case does not directly
relate to extraterritorial application of the First Amendment in the
context of a terrorist propagandist detained under U.S. custody and
control.
However, appellate counsel for al-Bahlul did not argue that al-
Bahlul was entitled to First Amendment rights while he was producing
his al Qaeda propaganda in Afghanistan. Instead, the argument related to
the extent that the U.S. government could go in punishing political
speech under its own auspices. This contention was exacerbated by the
fact that al-Bahlul was "haled into" U.S. jurisdiction "for criminal
prosecution."41 In other words, the appellate counsel contended that the
United States could not punish the political speech of a detainee held in
42
an extraterritorial U.S. jurisdiction such as Guantanamo Bay.
B. Determining who exactly is entitled to First Amendment protection
In analyzing whether or not an enemy propagandist detained in
extraterritorial detention is entitled to some semblance of political speech
protection, the first step is to review who exactly is protected by the First
A radio broadcast as an overt act can constitute treason since it
is a fallacy to argue that there must be something other than an
utterance of words if those words advocate the overthrow of a
government by force or to urge someone to engage in an act
akin to jihad against the United States.
Id. at 23.
41. Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 12, United States v. Al Bahlul, C.M.C.R.
No. 09-001 (U.S. Mil. Comm'n Sept. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/6%20%20%2oUnited%2oStates%20v%20%20al% 2 0
Bahlul%20-
%20Brief/o20for/20Appellant%20%281 %2OSeptember/202009%29.pdf.
42. The question is not what rights al-Bahlul had in Afghanistan, but the
extent to which U.S. courts can punish political speech. Cf United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (distinguishing between constitutional
violations that occur abroad, and constitutional violations that occur "at trial").
2011] 58 1
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Amendment.43 In the context of terrorism, citizens are always afforded
constitutional rights, as are legal resident aliens who are seized within the
territory of the United States.4 In fact, with respect to overseas
application, "the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the
Constitution provide to protect ... life and liberty" is specifically limited
an actual U.S. citizens who are abroad.45 As such, the Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that aliens located overseas are not protected by the
First Amendment. For example, an alien anarchist was prevented from
asserting his political speech rights in an immigration case relating to a
46government decision to prevent entry into the United States. In another
case, the Court put it bluntly in 1950 when it specifically rejected the
notion that "during military occupation irreconcilable enemy elements,
guerrilla fighters, and 'werewolves' could require the American
Judiciary to assure them freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as in
the First Amendment." 4 7
U.S. precedent generally states that aliens located abroad are not
protected by the First Amendment. But a wrinkle comes into play in
regard to terror suspects who were captured overseas and brought to an
extraterritorial location run by the U.S. government such as Guantanamo
Bay. Throughout the post-9/11 decade, the Supreme Court has gradually
43. The Constitution and its amendments are, first and foremost, a political
compact among the people of the United States, adopted "in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity." U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
44. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J.,
concurring), vacated and remanded sub nom., Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545
(2009). See also Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 396 (4th Cir. 2005) (reversing the
lower court in finding that the petitioner was legally designated and held as an
"enemy combatant"). In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), a former
Guantanamo Bay inmate was deemed to have all constitutional rights after it was
determined that he held not only Saudi citizenship but also U.S. citizenship. Id. at
508.
45. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-
6 (1957)).
46. United States ex rel. Turner v.Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904). See
also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (addressing whether the First
Amendment rights of U.S. citizens extends to allowing a non-citizen to visit the
United States to foster debate).
47. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950).
582 [Vol. 9
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afforded detainees various enhanced rights traditionally limited to U.S.
citizens and those seized within the nation's borders. For example, the
Court ruled that all Guantanamo Bay detainees have the right to
48
challenge their detention in federal court via habeas corpus. More
specifically, the Court in Boumediene v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
afforded the alien detainees certain due process protections of the Fifth
Amendment.4 9 These decisions raise the question: Can these Fifth
Amendment protections for alien detainees be construed as a sort of
slippery slope toward other constitutional protections?
The answer is likely geared toward what is not included within
the Boumediene decision rather than what is contained in the ruling.50
48. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 724 (2008) (finding unconstitutional
an act by Congress meant to limit a detainee's ability to petition for habeas corpus);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004), superseded by statute, Detainee Treatment
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2005), as recognized in Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160,
166-67 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that federal courts do have jurisdiction over the
habeas corpus claims of those indefinitely detained at Guantanamo Bay).
The right of military detainees to have habeas corpus petitions heard in federal
courts has been the source of frequent congressional action and judicial review. In
2005, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act which stated that federal courts
did not have jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions raised by Guantanamo
detainees. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (codified as amended 28 U.S.C. §
2241 (2005)). The Supreme Court held that federal courts still had jurisdiction over
habeas corpus petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees before Congress enacted the
DTA. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 571-76 (2006). In response to this
holding, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 which clarified
that federal courts did not have jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions pending
prior to the enactment of the DTA. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as
amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)). In the wake of Congress's enactment of the
MCA, the Supreme Court declared in Boumediene that the Guantanamo detainees in
that case had a "constitutional privilege of habeas corpus." 553 U.S. at 724, 798.
49. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 784-85; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531 (2004).
50. Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common
Law ofHabeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 465 (2010). Azmy explained:
Contrary to the categorical reading of Eisentrager advanced by
the Government in both Rasul and Boumediene - that neither
the statutory writ nor the Constitution applies to places over
which the U.S. is not formally sovereign - the Court
recognized that "practical considerations" largely animated the
Court's resistance to extending constitutional rights to the
German prisoners held at Landsberg Air Force Base in post-
war Germany. Sovereignty was not, in fact, crucial to the
2011] 583
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The Boumediene Court did not address issues such as First Amendment
rights. Instead, the Court conducted an extensive analysis of the history
and Court precedent relating specifically to the issue of habeas corpus"
rather than to the larger issue of constitutional rights of detainees; this
approach is similar to the one that played out in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in
regard to the character of the military commissions system.52 This means
that the due process rights afforded to detainees are limited to the
holdings in those cases and consequently do not speak to the issue of
First Amendment protection for detainees.
C. Key elements for enemy propagandists to achieve Constitutional
protection
If one accepts that Boumediene and Hamdan do not extend First
Amendment rights to detainees, then it appears that a detained
propagandist would have to satisfy one of three key elements in order to
be provided First Amendment protections. The first of the three options
to be considered, as mentioned above, is that the detainee would need to
be a U.S. citizen or U.S. national.53 Al-Bablul clearly fails this test
because he is a citizen of Yemen. Contrast this with the case of Adam
Gadahn, the al Qaeda propagandist. Gadahn was born in California and
consequently will be afforded First Amendment rights if he is arrested
and brought to trial.54 However, an interesting aside to Gadahn's case is
that he publicly destroyed his passport as he renounced his U.S.
citizenship." While this could develop into an interesting twist to his
Court's opinion: it was only mentioned twice in an opinion
that spent considerably more time describing the practical
difficulties of extending the writ (and constitutional rights) to
persons held in another country during active hostilities.
Id.
51. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739-52.
52. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590-613.
53. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261-62 (1990).
54. See Kash, supra note 40, at 2, 23 (finding that as a U.S. citizen, Gadahn
will be entitled to constitutional rights, although the criminal elements of treason
will likely overtake any First Amendment claims pertaining to propaganda activity
on behalf of al Qaeda).
55. American-Born al Qaeda Spokesman Lashes Out at U.S. in New Tape, AP,
Jan. 6, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,320521,00.html ("In symbolic
[Vol. 9584
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potential trial claims relating to the First Amendment and other
constitutional protections, Gadahn's renunciation of his citizenship was
indeed merely symbolic under U.S. domestic law.5 6 The reason is
because in order to technically renounce U.S. citizenship, one must go
through various administrative procedures as prescribed by law. 5 7
Therefore, Gadahn would go through a potential trial armed with full
constitutional protections because he is a U.S. citizen as a matter of
law.58 Al-Bahlul, meanwhile, failed this first element on the basis of
citizenship.
If a detainee is deemed not to be a U.S. citizen, the next element
to review is the location of where the detainee was seized. In order to
achieve enhanced constitutional rights for a non-citizen in a criminal
prosecution, the detainee must have been seized within the United
States.59 For example, a non-citizen who was a notoriously militant union
advocate was detained within the United States and was consequently
deemed to have First Amendment protections.60 In a more recent
instance, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, an al Qaeda sleeper agent and
citizen of Qatar, was seized within the United States and, therefore,
afforded similar constitutional protections.6' As a result, al-Marri
rejection of the American citizenship that honorable and decent and compassionate
people are ashamed to carry, I will now proceed to destroy my American passport.").
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (2006) (requiring "making a formal renunciation of
nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign
state, in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State . .
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008); United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F. 3d 213, 219
(4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., concurring), vacated and remanded sub nom., Al-Marri v.
Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). But
see United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) (anarchist was
captured in New York and faced deportment under administrative rules as opposed
to criminal prosecution); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 848-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[Constitutional rights are] derived from the consent of the governed ... in which
citizens (not 'subjects') are afforded defined protections against the Government.").
60. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) ("Freedom of speech and of
press is accorded aliens residing in this country.").
61. AI-Marri, 534 F.3d at 219 (Motz, J., concurring), vacated and remanded
sub nom., Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (prohibiting "military force,"
i.e. Navy custody, against Qatari citizen residing legally inside the United States).
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satisfied the constitutional rights rule established in Verdugo-Urquidez of
actually residing within the "borders of the country." 62
The common thread with all such precedent is that it involves
non-U.S. citizens located within the United States at the time of their
seizure. In al-Marri, the court specifically objected to military detention
of a civilian "in this country" as opposed to an alien detained abroad.
As such, al-Marri fails the first test as a citizen of Qatar but passes the
second test due to the fact that he was captured within the United States.
As a result, al-Marri would have been afforded enhanced constitutional
rights. In regard to al-Bahlul, while it is undisputed that al-Bahlul has
been held under the authority of the U.S. government, the fact remains
that he was captured outside the borders of the country and held outside
the borders of the country through the duration of his trial. As a result, al-
Bahlul fails this second test and is only entitled to the benefits afforded
to him by cases such as Boumediene.64
It should be noted that the appellate counsel for al-Bahlul
attempted to argue that al-Bahlul was entitled to First Amendment
protections under the assertion that it was the U.S. government that
brought him into a U.S. military commission at Guantanamo Bay.
However, this argument also does not carry much weight because in
instances where the U.S. government reaches abroad against an
individual, the Constitution only applies when that overseas individual is
I .. 65
a U.S. citizen. Furthermore, the facts indicate that government
personnel captured al-Bahlul under the good faith (and accurate) belief
that al-Bahlul was not protected by the U.S. Constitution on the basis that
62. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270-71.
63. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 222 (Motz, J., concurring), vacated and remanded
sub nom., Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
64. The Court acknowledges that prolonged detention under U.S. military
control does have an effect in terms of levying more rights upon alien detainees.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 793 ("(]t likely would be both an impractical and
unprecedented extension of judicial power to assume that habeas corpus would be
available at the moment the prisoner is taken into custody."). See also Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466, 488 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Perhaps, where detainees are
taken from a zone of hostilities, detention without proceedings or trial would be
justified by military necessity for a matter of weeks; but as the period of detention
stretches from months to years, the case for continued detention to meet military
exigencies becomes weaker.").
65. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261.
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he was not a U.S. citizen and consequently a legitimate alien enemy
combatant. As such, the Verdugo-Urquidez standard applies to enemy
propagandists who are extraterritorially detained and prosecuted by the
U.S. government. The key factor for non-citizens is whether the detainee
was captured within the United States or abroad.
If the previous two elements fail, the third and least reliable
measure is to look into whether an alien detainee captured overseas holds
substantial connections to the United States. This is because, in some
instances, additional forms of constitutional rights have been afforded to
67people holding a substantial nexus to the country. However, in the
instances where enhanced constitutional rights were afforded to a
substantially connected alien, the offending activity occurred within U.S.
borders.68 For the small amount of instances relating to overseas
application of this substantial connections test, individuals were limited
to due process rights under the Fifth Amendment similar to those granted
69to Guantanamo Bay detainees in Boumediene.
66. See, e.g., Combatant Status Review Board for Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman
al Bahlul, Exhibit R-1, Sept. 7, 2004, available at http://projects.nytimes.com
/guantanamo/detainees/39-ali-hamza-ahmad-suliman-al-
bahlul/documents/5/pages/42#1 (explaining that an administrative board dissected
the facts of the case, including that al-Bahlul was determined by the U.S.
Government to be an alien enemy combatant subject to detention and administrative
proceedings at Guantanamo Bay under rules enacted for such alien enemy
combatants engaged in hostilities on behalf of al Qaeda or the Taliban).
67. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982) ("[W]e reasoned from the
understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to afford its protection
to all within the boundaries of a State."); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Nat'l
Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
("[W]e have reviewed the entire record including the classified information and
determine that NCRI can rightly lay claim to having come within the territory of the
United States and developed substantial connections with this country.").
68. See, e.g., Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 69 (D.D.C. 2008)
("Aliens who have 'come within this country' . . . are entitled to constitutional
protections.") (quoting Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran, 251 F.3d at 201).
69. See, e.g., Al-Aqeel, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 70-71. The Al-Aqeel court
explained:
Plaintiff has standing to raise claims under the due process
clause of the Fifih Amendment. The same cannot be said
concerning Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim. It is settled
law that the Fourth Amendment does not "restrain the actions
In Al-Aqeel v Paulson, a Saudi citizen was deemed to have a
"sufficient nexus with the United States" that included frequent travel to
the United States, acquiring property in Missouri, and serving as
president of an Oregon corporation.70 While this sufficient nexus served
to provide certain due process rights under the Fifth Amendment at trial,
claims to assert Fourth Amendment rights were outright rejected.7 From
this result, it is fair to surmise that under similar conditions involving an
overseas alien, other non-trial-based fundamental constitutional rights
such as the First Amendment will be similarly rejected.
One other aspect to consider is the issue of extraterritorial
detention. Guantanamo Bay was deemed by the Supreme Court in the
major detainee cases to be a location that allowed for certain rights.72
However, a 2010 decision in the D.C. Circuit determined that there was a
difference between a secure U.S. controlled environment, such as
Guantanamo Bay, and a recognized warzone as is the case of the U.S.-
73
run Bagram airbase outside of Kabul, Afghanistan. As a result,
detainees held at Bagram are not entitled to the enhanced protections that
are afforded to those detainees housed at Guantanamo Bay. 74
D. National security factor
Taking it further, the Supreme Court in Verdugo-Urquidez also
rejected the extension of constitutional rights to aliens residing overseas
of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United
States territory."
Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990))
(emphasis in original).
70. Id at 70.
7 1. Id.
72. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008) ("[T]he
Government has not established that the detainees' access to the statutory review
provisions at issue is an adequate substitute for the writ of habeas corpus.").
73. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("It is undisputed
that Bagram, indeed the entire nation of Afghanistan, remains a theater of war . ...
[AJII of the attributes of a facility exposed to the vagaries of war are present in
Bagram.").
74. Id. at 97-98.
588 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
'TERRORIST SPEECH'
due to the potential effect on national security. The national security
dynamic often has been raised in domestic cases relating to U.S.
entities. However, the standard is extremely high to justify national
security trumping First Amendment rights of someone located within the
United States.7 7 The standard is much lower when applied to law
enforcement operations occurring overseas against non-citizens. Coupled
with the fact that the Court has consistently limited First Amendment
rights to apply mainly to U.S. citizens and other individuals residing
within the United States,78 it seems quite likely that overseas alien
propagandists cannot hang their hats on First Amendment protections.
According to the Court, offering constitutional rights such as the
Fourth and Sixth Amendment to overseas aliens "would have significant
and deleterious consequences for the United States in conducting
activities beyond its boundaries."79 The cited activities include law
enforcement operations as well as "other foreign policy operations which
might result in searches or seizures.,,s Although the Court did not
directly address First Amendment protections, it appears from a practical
standpoint that a propagandist working with an international terrorist
organization still would be considered an enemy combatant due to the
fact that the propagandist uses words and media equipment instead of
bombs and rifles.
II. BYPASSING THE FIRST AMENDMENT FOR A CIRCUMSTANCE THEORY
One way to avoid the pure political speech aspect of a
propagandist's work is to view the facts of the case in the prism of the
purported crime itself. U.S. case law does provide exceptions to First
75. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990) ("[T]he
result of accepting his claim would have significant and deleterious consequences
for the United States in conducting activities beyond its boundaries.").
76. See generally New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(per curiam) (holding that the United States could not enjoin The New York Times
and The Washington Post from publishing information about U.S. strategy during
the Vietnam War).
77. Id. at 714 (finding that the Government failed to meet its substantial
burden in justifying prior restraint of the so-called Pentagon Papers).
78. See discussion supra Part I.C.
79. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273.
80. Id.
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Amendment rights, even those pertaining to its own citizens. Perhaps the
most widely cited test is that articulated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, in
which the Court offered a limited standard where "acts and statements
that instruct, solicit, or persuade others to commit crimes of violence" are
generally not protected by the First Amendment. However, the First
Amendment is so regaled in U.S. society that Brandenburg presents a
lofty standard before releasing First Amendment protections.82 This
means that it would be very difficult to prosecute propaganda
disseminators that use platforms such as video or the Internet. Moreover,
the Brandenburg test includes an imminence requirement; applying this
requirement to terrorist speech, the prosecution must show that the
propagandist intended to cause violent incitement in cases where no
practical assistance is conveyed in the message.83 So, if al-Bahlul was
81. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). See also Hess v. Indiana,
414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that an antiwar demonstrator's speech did
not fall within the scope of the speech left unprotected by Brandenburg because it
was not advocating action). One scholar explained:
The [Brandenburg] Court held that advocacy of the use of
force or unlawful activity was unprotected only where (a) it is
directed at inciting (b) imminent, lawless action, and (c) is
likely to incite or produce such action. This test means that the
actor must intend the action to produce a certain effect - but
it does not require that that effect become manifest. In a
subsequent case, the Court suggested that imminent lawless
action amounted to a matter of hours - or at most, several
days; it did not open the door to indefinite action.
Laura K. Donahue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 248 (2005).
82. Megan Anne Healy, Comment, How the Legal Regimes of the European
Union and the United States Approach Islamic Terrorist Web Sites: A Comparative
Analysis, 84 TUL. L. REV. 165, 186 (2009). Healy noted:
The First Amendment's freedom of speech is one of the
most cherished rights protected by the U.S. Constitution
and it has helped the United States to stand apart as a free
nation in this world for centuries. Therefore, if there should
be any barrier at all to prosecuting the creators and
operators of terrorist Web sites, no nobler or worthier
obstacle exists than the right to free speech.
Id.
83. S. Chehani Ekaratne, Redundant Restriction: The U.K.'s Offense of
Glorifying Terrorism, 23 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 205, 219 (2010) ("[W]hen a statement
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afforded full First Amendment protection, he could have defended
himself on the basis that he was merely disseminating an open-ended,
innocuous propaganda message as opposed to a succinct, nuanced
directive constituting actual incitement. 4
But again, take a look at some of the charges in the al-Bahlul
case. Al-Bahlul was convicted of solicitation. While the speech related to
a solicitation charge has been deemed to be a "sometimes hazy line," the
crime of solicitation has a long history of being enforced.8 5 In al-Bahlul's
case, he was actively advocating violence and terrorism against the
United States. Furthermore, evidence presented at trial indicated that al-
Bahlul's proactive and targeted message was indeed bearing fruit in the
form of serving as the call-to-arms for other al Qaeda recruits.8 This
gives no practical assistance, the prosecution should be required to show intent, as
under the Brandenburg test."). But see generally Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal.
of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that that Internet postings
targeting abortion doctors were not protected speech under the First Amendment,
and instead were "true threats" under the intent to intimidate portions of the federal
Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act).
84. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) ("An
advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional
appeals .... When such appeals do not incite lawless action they must be regarded
as protected speech."). See also Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 244-45
(4th Cir. 1997) (finding that the Brandenburg test was inapplicable in a case where a
book author provided detailed instructions on how to conduct a contract killing).
85. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982) ("[W]hile a solicitation to enter
into an [criminal] agreement arguably crosses the sometimes hazy line distinguishing
conduct from pure speech, such a solicitation ... may properly be prohibited."); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965) ("[A] man may be punished for encouraging
the commission of a crime."); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The freedom to speak is not absolute; the teaching of
methods of terror . . . should be beyond the pale."); Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) ("It rarely has been suggested that the
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or
writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. We
reject the contention now."); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842 (9th Cir.
1982); United States v.Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970) ("[S]peech is not
protected by the First Amendment when it is the very vehicle for the crime itself.").
86. Carol Rosenberg, Ex-U.S. Jihadists Testify at Guantanamo Terror Trial,
MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 30, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 20710509 (including
testimony of Buffalo, NY terrorist sleeper agents describing the reactions of various
al Qaeda recruits upon viewing the recruitment video, including shouts of "Allahu
Akbar" and weeping at the perceived mistreatment of Muslim women). Although the
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targeted effort to solicit others into the al Qaeda enterprise of terrorist
operations certainly offers a more compelling argument against
recognizing First Amendment protection than in the most typical cases of
political or hate speech rants. Still, the First Amendment standard
remains especially high when applied in the traditional sense that the
words themselves are rarely enough to move the speaker outside of First
Amendment protection. This is particularly true based on the notion that
not all terrorist speech emanating from enemy propagandists will meet
the imminence requirements of the Brandenburg test.
A. Circumstance Theory
Al-Bahlul's crimes were material support to terrorism,
conspiracy, and solicitation. This means that a circumstance theory
similar to the "aid and comfort prong" of the test in treason cases 87may
be more useful than looking to traditional First Amendment
jurisprudence. Circumstance theory contends that it is not the words
that are being punished, but rather the overall circumstances and/or
venue in which these words were contained.8 For example, al-Bahlul
was not punished per se for advocating hatred for America. Instead, he
was punished for providing support to a designated terrorist organization
because of his direct involvement with al Qaeda.90 This means that al-
Bahlul maintained the equipment of al Qaeda's Media Committee. He
also carried out orders from the al Qaeda leadership to operate this
equipment. Al-Bahlul worked with al Qaeda senior leadership to
disseminate elements of terrorist operations in order to spread the
sleeper agents claimed in trial that they were turned off by the video's content, they
ultimately were convicted for establishing their al Qaeda operations in Buffalo. They
were collectively known as the Lackawanna Six. Id.
87. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
88. Kristen Eichensehr, Treason's Return, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 229,
230 (2007) ("The World War II propagandist cases mention 'levying war' only in
passing, and instead rest their decisions - all affirming guilty verdicts - on the 'aid
and comfort' prong.").
89. Ekaratne, supra note 83, at 220 (describing the case of Ali Al-Timimi, who
was sentenced to life in prison for verbally inducing Islamic students to use firearms
in a crime of violence, inducing others to carry explosives in order to commit a
felony, and inducing others to levy war against the United States).
90. Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 814-15.
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viability and "terror" dynamic that was to accompany al Qaeda's
unlawful operations. Since the terror message and recruiting are part and
parcel with the mission of a terrorist group, al-Bahlul was performing his
function as a terrorist and not merely as an innocuous media man or
political pundit.9 ' Therefore, the content of the words coming from the
terrorist group was irrelevant because the crime itself was working with
al Qaeda to essentially conduct business in furtherance of the operational
terrorist enterprise.
This, in some ways, is similar to income tax protesters convicted
for counseling others not to pay taxes. For example, the Ninth Circuit
explained that "the First Amendment is quite irrelevant if the intent of
the actor and the objective meaning of the words are so close in time and
purpose to a substantive evil as to become part of the ultimate crime
itself."92 Similarly, in a civil case involving the dissemination of an
instructional guide on how to conduct a murder-for-hire, the Fourth
Circuit held "speech" does not enjoy First Amendment protection where
the accused has the specific purpose of "assisting and encouraging" the
commission of criminal conduct, and the assistance and encouragement
takes a form other than "abstract advocacy."93
B. Choosing Humanitarian Law Project over Brandenburg
Circumstance theory also helps distinguish a case of direct
terrorist propaganda from more traditional elements of hate speech or
provocative political speech that are normally protected under
Brandenburg.9 4 In fact, from the perspective of the government, a direct
91. See generally EBEN KAPLAN, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., TERRORISTS AND
THE INTERNET (2009), http://www.cfr.org/publication/10005
/terrorists and the internet.html# ("Terrorist websites can serve as virtual training
grounds, offering tutorials on building bombs, firing surface-to-air missiles, shooting
at U.S. soldiers, and sneaking into Iraq from abroad."). See also EBEN KAPLAN,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., INSPIRING TERROR (2006), http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-
and-technology/inspiring-terror/p11035 ("Al Qaedaism" is the generating of
individual terrorist cells by inspiring others into the ideological movement through
disseminating the terrorist organization's message.).
92. United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1982).
93. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997).
94. See Ekaratne, supra note 83, at 207; see also Healy, supra note 82, at 193;
Donohue, supra note 81, at 243. See also Chris Montgomery, Can Brandenburg v.
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attack on terrorist speech has a much higher threshold due to the
extremely high standards set out in Brandenburg.9 5 Therefore, the
summer 2010 decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
essentially affirmed the circumstance theory as an alternative to a head-
on approach to the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and
96
association. This is because the Court determined that the content of the
words was not as pertinent as the circumstance of providing material
support to a designated terrorist organization.
Humanitarian Law Project is in part related to religious
materials that, if challenged in the United States among its own citizens,
98
would almost certainly be deemed protected speech. However, due to
the circumstance that the physical documents and media items were
Ohio Survive the Internet and the Age of Terrorism? The Secret Weakening of a
Venerable Doctrine, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 141, 162 (2009) ("[Mlany commentators have
started arguing that the Brandenburg test is incapable of handling the new
communications framework presented by the Internet.").
95. Montgomery, supra note 94, at 166 ("A major reason why the government
is leaning on the private sector to police online activity is that the Brandenburg
doctrine makes it so difficult to secure prosecutions for inflammatory rhetoric.").
96. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at ,130 S. Ct. at 2718 (2010). As
the Humanitarian Law Project Court explained:
There is no basis whatever in the text of § 2339B to read the
same provisions in that statute as requiring intent in some
circumstances but not others. It is therefore clear that plaintiffs
are asking us not to interpret § 2339B, but to revise it.
Although this Court will often strain to construe legislation so
as to save it against constitutional attack, it must not and will
not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a
statute.'
Id. (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961)).
97. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2718. In his
dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer rejected the majority approach, finding that:
limit[ing] the scope of its argument by pointing to some
special limiting circumstance present here. That is because the
only evidence the majority offers to support its general claim
consists of a single reference to a book about terrorism, which
the Government did not mention, and which apparently says
no more than that at one time the PKK suspended its armed
struggle and then returned to it.
Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2738.
98. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2708 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2009)).
knowingly distributed among a designated terrorist organization in
furtherance of that organization's activities, the First Amendment did not
inhibit punishment under a material support for terrorism conviction.99
The Court added that under this circumstance the required mental state is
knowledge about the organization's connection to terrorism and not the
specific intent to further its terrorist activities. 00
By applying this rationale, it appears that the Brandenburg test is
bypassed in favor of a more defined approach that focuses more squarely
on the issue and criminal elements of material support for terrorism.
From a practical standpoint, this method serves to avoid the issue of
extraterritorial application of the First Amendment altogether and instead
place the onus on the nexus between offering support and/or resources
with knowledge of the organization's connection to terrorism.
C. Treason Precedent
In many ways, the notion of bypassing traditional First
Amendment arguments in favor of a more tangible approach is nothing
new. o0 This is especially pertinent with respect to wartime cases
involving propagandists. The most prominent example relates to the
charge of treason.102 In fact, treason convictions levied against enemy
propagandists have consistently been upheld against U.S. citizens
working for the other side. 03 It is that level of legal separation from
traditional First Amendment arguments that demonstrates the
effectiveness in pursuing an alternative to the historic speech argument
that is centric to Brandenburg and its predecessors. As a result, the case
against current al Qaeda propagandist and U.S. citizen Adam Gadahn
99. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at ,_ 130 S. Ct. at 2725
("Congress's use of the term 'contribution' is best read to reflect a determination that
any form of material support furnished 'to' a foreign terrorist organization should be
barred, which is precisely what the material-support statute does.").
100. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2709.
101. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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will certainly be less about the First Amendment and more focused on
the criminal elements of treason.104
Historically, several courts rejected First Amendment arguments
when upholding treason convictions of U.S. citizens who broadcast
propaganda messages on behalf of enemy military forces during World
War 11.105 The case against Iva Ikuko Toguri d'Aquino, for example,
involved a U.S. citizen of Japanese descent who became synonymous
with the imperial Japan's "Tokyo Rose" propaganda campaign.106
Aquino assisted the Japanese in broadcasting numerous radio messages
directed at American military forces.107 During the post-war U.S.
108
occupation of Japan, Aquino was captured by American personnel.
She was subsequently interrogated and held in extraterritorial military
detention for more than a year prior to being prosecuted for treason.1 0 9
During the trial, a jury was asked to determine the veracity of Aquino's
defense that her intent was merely to entertain American troops and
prisoners of war.o1 0 Other than the intent aspect, her prosecution revolved
around the issue of treason and not the First Amendment. Ultimately,
Aquino served six years in prison.
The cases against al-Bahlul and Adam Gadahn have some
similarities to that of Aquino. Al-Bahlul was held in extraterritorial
104. See generally Eichensehr, supra note 88 (discussing the treason charges
brought against Adam Gadahn). In discussing the likelihood of Gadahn receiving
First Amendment protections, Eichensher stated: "Only First Amendment free
speech claims would remain to protect political dissenters - claims soundly rejected
by the courts in the World War 11 propaganda cases." Id. at 232.
105. See Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 938 (1st Cir. 1948) (holding
that one may give aid and comfort to the enemy through communication just as one
may commit treason by the communication of intelligence); Gillars v. United States,
182 F.2d 962, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1950)("[W]ords which reasonably viewed constitute
acts in furtherance of a program of an enemy to which the speaker adheres and to
which he gives aid with intent to betray his own country, are not rid of criminal
character merely because they are words.").
106. D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951). See also FBI -
Iva Toguri d'Aquino and "Tokyo Rose," http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/history/famous-cases/tokyo-rose (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
107. "Tokyo Rose," supra note 106.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. D'Aquino, 192 F.2d at 352.
111. See "Tokyo Rose," supra note 106.
military detention at Guantanamo Bay prior to his prosecution. This is
somewhat comparable to Aquino's pre-prosecution detention in Japan
because both were held and interrogated specifically because of their
propagandist roles with their respective enemy groups.' 12 Moreover,
Aquino's prosecution focused on treason and avoided the issue of First
Amendment protection. Al-Bahlul, as a non-citizen, was convicted for
his propagandist role under the guise of providing material support for
terrorism. In addition, Gadahn would likely be prosecuted in much the
same manner as Aquino. This conclusion is based on the fact that all of
the claims of First Amendment protection by World War II enemy
propagandists were soundly rejected by the courts." 3
What we learn from both the treason cases and Humanitarian
Law Project is that dealings with an identified terrorist organization can
make free speech arguments irrelevant. Under this logic, it appears that
material support for terrorism is the non-citizen pseudo companion
charge to treason when the case involves speech and propaganda activity.
It is under this general theory that non-citizen al Qaeda propagandists
will continue to be convicted without protection from the First
Amendment.
III. COMPARING CONVICTIONS OF AL QAEDA & RWANDAN
PROPAGANDISTS
Although the First Amendment relates to U.S. domestic law, it is
important to briefly mention how other recent international war crimes
courts have viewed the issue of propagandists. It is particularly relevant
to compare the U.S. Military Commission's conviction of al Qaeda
propagandist al-Bahlul with those in other, more internationally
recognized forums. Perhaps the best recent example relates to Ferdinand
Nahimana, Hassan Ngeze, and Jean Bosco Barayagwiza.1 4 These media
figures were convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda for their propagandist role, primarily through the use of radio,
112. D'Aquino, 192 F.2d at 350; Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 956-57.
113. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
114. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and
Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.rwandainitiative.cal
resources/pdfs/judgment.pdf.
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during the 1994 genocide."' The legal proceedings became known as the
"media trial."' 6 In fact, the 2003 Rwandan "media trial" was the first
international war crimes conviction solely involving "hate speech" since
that of Nazi propagandist Julius Streicher.m Al-Bahlul, meanwhile, was
initially detained by U.S. forces in 2002 and convicted of war crimes in
part for his terrorist speech about five years after the Rwandan trial."1 8
Nahimana, in particular, founded a propagandist radio station as
well as produced a number of anti-Tutsi publications." 9 The radio station
was known as "Radio Machete," a rather odious term considering that
tens of thousands of Tutsis were slaughtered by the large machete
knife. 120 In defending himself from the incitement to genocide charge,
Nahimana claimed that he merely operated the radio station but directed
no editorial control. 121 The tribunal rejected Nahimana's arguments and
ruled that propagandists were just as culpable as those physically doing
the killing. 12 The tribunal found that the media men "were the bullets
and the gun." "The trigger had such a deadly impact because the gun
was loaded."1 23
Certainly the Nahimana and Streicher cases differ from al-
Bahlul in that the international tribunal proceedings in the former cases
related to internationally-sanctioned charges of genocide.124 In contrast,
115. Id. at 318 ("[The] RTLM broadcasts engaged in ethnic stereotyping in a
manner that promoted contempt and hatred for the Tutsi population and called on
listeners to seek out and take up arms against the enemy.").
116. Andrew K. Woods, A Behavioral Approach to Human Rights, 51 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 51, 92 (2010).
117. Id. at 51.
118. Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 992.
119. Nahimana, Judgment and Sentence, at 215-33.
120. Id. at 342. See also Betsy Pisik, Hateful Words a War Crime, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, at A01, available at 2003 WLNR 756719.
121. Nahimana, Judgment and Sentence, at 322-23.
122. Id at 360-61. On appeal, all three sentences were reduced to between 30
and 35 years imprisonment. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A,
Appeals Judgment, at 346-47 (Nov. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.concernedhistorians.org/content-files/file/le/82.pdf.
123. Nahimana, Judgment and Sentence, at 319. See also Woods, supra note
116, at 92.
124. G.A. Res. 260 (111), at art. 111(c), U.N. Doc. A/RES/260 (111) [A-C] (Dec.
9, 1948), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION
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al-Bahlul was prosecuted under U.S. domestic law pursuant to the
Military Commissions Act of 2006.125 However, during the sentencing
phase of al-Bahlul's trial, victim impact statements were presented
directly related to the effects of al-Bahlul's propagandist role in
producing a USS Cole attack video as a recruitment and exploitation
tool.126
The utility of comparing Nahimana with al-Bahlul is to further
enforce the notion that the 21st Century international community
continues to be willing to accept that propagandists can be prosecuted for
war crimes.127 At the same time, the U.S. has shown its own willingness
to bypass First Amendment arguments for detained al Qaeda
propagandists by prosecuting their terrorist speech under the guise of
material support, solicitation, and conspiracy charges.18 Of course, this
willingness does not come without trepidation. For example, Karin
Karlekar, the managing editor of Freedom House's annual media survey,
warned that some governments may use such international verdicts to
/GEN/NRO/044/31/IMG/NR004431.pdf?OpenElement. See also Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, T 559 (Sept. 2, 1998), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,ICTR,,,40278fbb4,0.html (follow "The
Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Jean-Paul Akayesu (Sentencing Judgement)"
hyperlink). The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda explained:
[D]irect and public incitement must be defined for the
purposes of interpreting Article 2(3)(c) [of the Statute of the
Tribunal], as directly provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit
genocide, whether through speeches, shouting or threats
uttered in public places or at public gatherings, or through the
sale or dissemination, offer for sale or display of written
material or printed matter in public places or at public
gatherings, or through the public display of placards or posters,
or through any other means of audiovisual communication. To
make the determination that the defendants had committed the
crime of incitement, the court reviewed particular pieces of
speech and determined whether or not they contributed to the
poisonous climate.
Id.
125. Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948 (2006). The Military
Commissions Act was revised in 2009.
126. Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 734.
127. Id. at 923-34.
128. Id. at 916-17 (finding al-Bahlul guilty on several charges, including those
related to his role as a propagandist).
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clamp down on their own county's press freedoms. 129 "These (Rwandan)
guys were way over the line, but it's a gray area (of public speech) that is
endangered, especially in countries with racial or ethnic tension."' 30 A
similar school of thought has popped up in the U.S. where some legal
scholars levy concern over the use of terrorist speech as a pretext to roll
back the effectiveness of Brandenburg and also create a culture of
chilled free speech.131 In this regard, there are more similarities between
the U.S. Military Commission's prosecution and the Nahimana case than
many might want to admit.
CONCLUSION
Free speech is undoubtedly a fundamental right afforded to U.S.
citizens. There remains, however, a gray area in terms of the speech
protections afforded to enemy propagandists that are detained by U.S.
forces for an extended period of time. The example presented here in
regard to al-Bahlul is one such case where a dedicated al Qaeda member
used terrorist speech as his primary jihadist weapon against the West. He
produced and distributed videos on behalf of al Qaeda. When al-Bahlul
was finally captured, he was ultimately detained under extraterritorial
conditions at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay for about five years
until he was prosecuted by a military commission. In the end, al-Bahlul
was sentenced to life in U.S. custody for his war crimes.
But in analyzing a potential war crimes prosecution against a
propagandist conducted under U.S. jurisdiction, the first step is to
identify whether or not the propagandist is afforded some level of
129. Pisik, supra note 120.
130. Id.
131. See Donahue, supra note 81, at 250. Donahue noted:
Perhaps of greater concern is the sense that to focus on
Brandenburg is to focus on the past, and not on the more likely
manner in which counterterrorism currently or will in the
future affect free speech. Here, there are a range of areas in
which Brandenburg has only a limited reach or where it does
not reach at all, such as knowledge-based speech and counter-
terrorist provisions with significant secondary effects on
expression.
Id
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constitutional rights. Lengthy extraterritorial detention in places such as
Guantamo Bay, but not in active warzones like Bagram airbase in Kabul,
Afghanistan, is one factor in this analysis.132 In cases not involving an
active warzone, we already know that due process, habeas corpus, and
certain trial protections are afforded to the detainee.133 Assuming the
detainee is not a U.S. citizen, one will want to take into account the
location from which the detainee was seized. If the detainee was seized
in the U.S., then some sort of enhanced constitutional rights will likely
be available. Contrast this with a case involving a propagandist such as
al-Bahlul, who was captured at the Pakistan/Afghanistan border. A
detainee seized under those conditions will likely not have additional
constitutional protections like those afforded under the First Amendment
and Brandenburg.
However, because the Brandenburg standard is so engrained in
U.S. culture, the recent decision in Humanitarian Law Project offers a
more succinct option for government prosecution of propagandists.
Humanitarian Law Project essentially states that the elements of a
material support to terrorism charge, rather than the speech-related
activities themselves, are relevant to the judicial determination. As a
result, the Brandenburg test is bypassed in favor of a more defined
approach that focuses on the criminal elements of material support for
terrorism. Practically, this method serves to avoid the issue of
extraterritorial application of the First Amendment altogether and instead
highlights the nexus between knowingly offering support and/or
resources to a terrorist organization, regardless of the type of support
provided.
132. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010). See also supra
note 73 and accompanying text.
133. Compare Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008) (finding that the
petitioner was entitled to habeas corpus) with Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 97 (finding
that because Afghanistan is an active "theater of war," certain constitutional
protections do not apply to detainees held there).
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